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Strengthening Credit Freeze Legislation in the States:  
Empowering Consumers to Prevent Economic Loss From Identity Theft  
 
Identity theft has been described as the “crime of the new millennium”i.  Since the 
mid-1990s, it has been known as the fastest growing crime in the United States.ii In 
November 2007, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) reported the results of its 
comprehensive survey of identity theft incidents during 2005.iii (hereinafter, the “FTC 2007 
Survey”).  The FTC 2007 Survey estimated that 8.3 million Americans were victims of 
identity theft.iv  Economic losses from identity theft have been estimated at $50 billion 
annually.v   Beyond the economic loss, the various forms of identity fraud have been 
condemned as a crisis threatening national security, global commerce and protection of 
society.vi  
 
Identity theft has continued to grow despite new legislation intended to prevent it.  
The state and federal legislative response to identity theft has primarily focused on information 
theft prevention by criminalizing theft of personally identifiable information.  Though necessary 
and well intended, these laws have not stopped the growth of identity theft.  Sophisticated 
criminals already have access to substantial amounts of identity information and are readily 
able to steal more information through hacking, data breaches, computer theft, phishing 
scams, spyware and other malicious activity.  These criminals also are able to sell or acquire 
the information on global black marketsvii and they have the computing power to aggregate 
identity data from many disparate sources in order to carry out their schemes. 
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Laws criminalizing information theft prevention must be complemented by laws 
aimed at economic loss prevention.  The FTC’s first survey of identity theft in 2003 (hereinafter, 
"FTC 2003 Survey”), estimated that nearly $37 billion dollars of identity theft losses, or 
nearly 70 percent, are caused by identity thieves’ ability to open new lines of credit.viii   Credit 
reporting agencies, lenders and merchants continue to use risky identity authentication 
practices that are not adequate to protect consumers from loss.  Savvy criminals quickly 
convert stolen identity information into money, goods and services.  These industry practices 
are unlikely to change because there are strong disincentives against making them more 
rigorous in a marketplace that expects instant credit.  Thus, the key to preventing economic 
loss is empowering consumers to protect themselves by taking control of their own credit 
information. 
 
This article will focus on state legislation designed to prevent identity theft economic 
losses - the credit freeze (also known as a security freeze).  Beginning with California in 
2003ix, forty seven states and the District of Columbia have now have armed consumers 
with a tool to prevent economic loss – the ability to place a freeze on their credit files.x   
Once a credit freeze is in place, credit reporting agencies are prohibited from releasing the 
credit verification information required for identity thieves to open new accounts with 
merchants and lenders.  Further, credit freeze legislation is an important as first step toward 
providing consumers with increased control over the security of their credit records.   
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This article will first introduce the nature of the identity theft schemes, the economic 
losses caused and the broad extent and seriousness of identity theft.  Second, the article will 
review the legislative response to identity theft.  Most legislation has focused on preventing 
information theft prevention by means of criminal statutes that have been largely ineffective.  
Third, the vulnerabilities in identity systems that make it exceeding difficult to effectively 
prevent theft of personal information will be considered.  Fourth, the article will review the 
risky credit and lending practices that enable identity thieves to open fraudulent new 
accounts and the disincentives against changing these practices.  Finally, the new state credit 
freeze legislation focused on economic loss prevention will be explored.  Permitting 
consumers to obtain a security freeze on their credit reports, thereby disrupting ability of 
identity thieves to open new accounts, is the most feasible and effective means to prevent 
economic loss.  It also is an important first step toward further strengthening consumer 
control over their credit information. 
 
I. Identity Theft and Economic Loss. 
  
 An identity fraud scheme can be divided into two main operational segments.  In the 
first segment, or “front end” of the scheme, the thief needs to illegally obtain and aggregate 
the personal information of the victim.  This stolen information enables the identity thief to 
assume the identity of the victim and transact business in the victim’s name.   In the second 
segment, or “back end” of the scheme, the thief needs to convert the stolen personal 
information into cash, property, vehicles, goods or services.  Identity thieves can manipulate 
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existing banking and credit accounts of the victim or they can establish new lending and 
credit accounts in the victim’s name.  This segment of the scheme enriches the thief and 
causes economic loss either to the individual victim, to the lenders or merchants holding the 
manipulated fraudulent accounts, or both. This article will focus on the “back end” of the 
identity theft scheme, i.e. the thieves’ ability to convert stolen personal information into ill-
gotten lucre.  
 
 Mushrooming identity theft in the early 2000s caused the FTC to undertake a 
comprehensive attempt to estimate the number of victims and the economic losses caused  
by identity theft.  The FTC 2003 Survey concluded that over 9.9 million Americans were 
victims of identity theft that caused losses of $52.6 billion per year.xi It also found that 
identity theft victims spent a total of 297 million hours of time attempting to recover from 
the effects of their stolen identity.xii   Frauds involving new accounts and other frauds 
accounted for nearly $37 billion dollars in losses to businesses and consumers.  The average 
loss involving fraudulent new accounts was more than seven times larger than consumers’ 
average loss caused by misuse of existing accounts.xiii  For businesses and financial 
institutions, the average loss from fraud involving new accounts was $10,200, nearly five 
times the average loss of $2,100 on existing accounts. Frauds involving new accounts also 
took four times as long for victims to correct.xiv   It is clear from the FTC 2003 Survey that 
restricting the identity thieves’ ability to open new lines of credit is essential to reducing 
economic loss from identity theft. 
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Other studies supported the conclusions of the FTC 2003 Survey.  Research in 2003 
by Gartner Inc.xv and Harris Interactivexvi estimated that identity theft affected 7 million U.S. 
adults per year.  Harris estimated 33.4 million total victims in the U.S.xvii   Aberdeen Group 
research estimated U.S. losses at $73.8 billion by the end of 2003, with worldwide losses at 
$221 billion.xviii  A study by Javelin Strategy and Research conducted in 2004 estimated that 
9.3 million Americans became victims of identity theft in the 12 months preceding the 
survey.xix  The Javelin survey reported a mean cost per victim of $5,686 and a total loss from 
identity theft of $52.6 billion.xx   
 
 The Identity Theft Resource Center (“ITRC”) study in the summer 2003 reported 
that in 73 percent of identity theft cases, the stolen identity information was used to open 
new accounts.xxi  The ITRC study found the victims spent an average of 600 hours 
attempting to resolve their claimsxxii and that 41 percent of victims were still attempting to 
resolve their problems more than two years after the fact.xxiii    
 
One difficulty in accurately quantifying the frequency and cost of identity theft is that 
most identity crimes go unreported.  The FTC 2007 Survey found that only 26 percent 
reported their loss to police.xxiv  The FTC's Consumer Sentinel reported that 65 percent of 
identity theft victims do not contact police, and a further 6 percent of victims never have a 
report taken.xxv  The Consumer Sentinel Network law enforcement database logged only 
313,982 identity theft complaints in 2008 even though FTC 2007 Survey estimate of the 
number of victims was 8.3 million adults.xxvi 
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In the wake of this alarming data, consumers, merchants, and lenders attempted to 
reduce identity theft by modifying their credit practices.  However, identity theft rings also 
have increased in their size, scale and sophistication.  Whether identity theft losses have 
increased or decreased in recent years is open to dispute.
 xxvii
 The FTC 2007 Survey 
estimated 8.3 million victims in 2006, which is 17% lower than the estimate of 9.9 million 
victims reported in the FTC 2003 Survey.xxviii  The FTC 2007 Survey estimated that 
economic losses had dropped to $15.6 billion from $52.6 billion in the FTC 2003 Survey. 
However the survey methodology had changed, so it could not be determined whether 
significant reductions in economic loss had actually occurred.xxix   
 
Javelin Strategy and Research estimated that in 2006 there were 8.4 million identity 
theft victims who suffered losses of $49.3 billion.xxx  However, Javelin reported an increase 
to nearly 10 million victims during 2008.xxxi  Further, a 2007 study by Gartner estimated that 
the number of victims actually had grown to 15 million, an increase of 50 percent over the 
FTC 2003 Survey.xxxii  Gartner also found that the average loss in new account fraud cases 
had more than doubled to $5,962.xxxiii 
 
Whether identity theft losses have increased or decreased since 2003 may be debated, 
it cannot be disputed that they remain at intolerable levels in 2009.   In the late 1990s, when 
identity theft was estimated to have 100,000 victims per year and annual losses were $2 
billion dollars, one commentator concluded, “Identity theft is out of control”.xxxiv   Today 
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there are approximately 100 times more victims annually and economic losses have increased 
approximately 25 times since the late 1990s.  The recent studies indicate that identity theft 
remains as  “out of control” as ever and that restricting new account fraud is critical to 
preventing economic loss from identity fraud. 
 
II. Legislation Directed at Information Theft Prevention Has Been Ineffective. 
 
 The rapid rise in identity theft claims and the mounting losses have received 
substantial legislative attention.  Statutes criminalizing identity theft activities has been 
enacted at both the federal and state level.  The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence 
Act of 1998,  (ITADA) made it a federal crime when an identity thief: 
 
 “knowingly transfers or uses, without lawful authority, a means of 
identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or 
abet, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or 
that constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local law.”xxxv  
 
ITADA broadly defined “means of identification” to include an expansive range of personal 
identifying information.xxxvi  ITADA also outlaws production, transfer and possession of 
false identification documents or authentication features.xxxvii 
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ITADA consolidated aspects of identity theft treated in other statutes and imposed a 
uniform and comprehensive approach to criminal penalties.xxxviii  It also made identity theft a 
crime against the individual person whose identity was stolen, allowing the victim to seek 
restitution.xxxix  Under previous law, identity theft was a crime only against the institution 
that suffered the loss and victims had no distinct legal standing.xl  ITADA also directed the 
FTC to take an active role in consumer education, victim assistance and creating a 
centralized complaint and record keeping database to track identity theft.xli 
 
 States also took up the challenge of responding to identity theft.  Arizona was the 
first state to enact an identity theft statute in 1996.xlii  By 2002, forty-four states had 
criminalized identity theft.xliii  Today, all fifty states have enacted some form of criminal 
statute outlawing identity theft,xliv and all states classify some form of identity theft as a 
felony, except Maine.xlv 
  
 Congress has continued to act.  The Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act,xlvi 
created the crime of aggravated identity theft, and increased penalties for identity theft when 
used in connection with other specified felonies.  The Internet False Identification 
Prevention Act made distribution of counterfeit identity information over the Internet a 
criminal offense. xlvii  The Secure Authorization Feature and Identification Defense Act 
(SAFE ID Act) made it a federal crime to traffic in false identification features for use in 
document or false identification documents or means of identification.xlviii 
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In addition to criminal statutes, Congress has enacted new privacy regulations to 
better safeguard consumers’ personal information. The Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA)xlix imposed new privacy regulations on the health care industry.  
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)l created new privacy requirements for the financial 
services industry.   The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, (the “FACT 
Act”)li amended the Fair Credit Reporting Actlii to extensively regulate the manner in which 
credit reporting agencies (“CRAs”) and other financial institutions handle consumer credit 
information.  The FACT Act allows consumers to place a fraud alert in their credit files held 
by CRAs if they believe they have been a victim of identity theft .  The fraud alert notifies 
potential creditors that they must use reasonable procedures to verify the identity of the 
person requesting credit.liii  The FACT Act also allows consumer to obtain free credit 
reports, and identity theft victims have the right to request and obtain information regarding 
transactions on their accounts, and to block information in their credit reports arising from 
identity theft.liv  In addition, President Bush created the President’s Task Force on Identity 
Theft to draft a strategic plan for a coordinated governmental approach for combating 
identity theft.lv 
 
 These legislative efforts are clearly steps in the right direction toward more secure and 
private handling of personal identifying information.  However, legislative solutions that 
have focused on criminalizing misuse of personal identifiable information have had 
profoundly little effectlvi for several reasons.  First, while handling private information more 
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carefully in the future is clearly important, these laws do not reduce the vast amounts of 
information already in the hands of identity thieves.  Second, criminal sanctions lack 
effectiveness because only a fraction of identity theft crimes are reportedlvii and investigated.   
Gartner has estimated that only one in 700 claims lead to an arrest.lviii   Lacking sufficient 
resources, the Department of Justice had charged only 658 defendants with aggravated 
identity theft in 2005 and 2006 combined.lix  Third, identity theft crimes are difficult and 
expensive to investigate.  The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) reported estimates of 
the cost of investigating white collar crimes, including identity theft cases, that ranged 
between $15,000 and $20,000 dollars per case.lx  The GAO estimated average prosecution 
costs for white collar crime cases at an additional $11,400 per case.lxi  Criminal investigation 
resources are usually directed towards violent crimes, drug offenses and other serious crime.   
 
Unfortunately, the volume of resources committed to identity theft investigations and 
prosecutions is dwarfed both by the number of victims and the economic losses.  Despite 
the new laws, identity thieves will continue to stealing the personally identifiable information 
of their victims with impunity – i.e. operating the “front end” of their schemes – for two 
reasons.  First, because criminal arrests, prosecutions and sanctions for information theft do 
not operate as an effective deterrent.  Second, past and current vulnerabilities continue 
provide ample opportunities to steal personal identifying information. 
 
III. Insecure Records, Data Storage and Identification Systems Make Information Theft 
Prevention Impossible. 
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The Internet and other computing and information technologies have brought 
enormous economic and social benefits, yet these technologies also have created new 
dangers to privacy that have outpaced existing legal protection.  The explosive development 
of computing power, information technologies and network connectivity over the past two 
decades has dramatically changed the landscape for securing the privacy of personal 
information used for identity theft.  One commentator described the situation as follows: 
 
These three developments all concern the changes wrought by digital 
technology on the ability to manipulate information. First, the amount of 
digital information generated is breathtaking.  Every interaction with the 
Internet, every credit card transaction, every bank withdrawal, every magazine 
subscription is recorded digitally and linked to specific individuals. In the 
analog world, these transactions were either not recorded at all or recorded on 
paper in a single location. Second, all this information, once it is collected in 
networked databases, can be sent instantly and cheaply around the globe. In 
this newly commoditized information market, buyers anywhere can collate and 
manipulate the data for marketing, profiling, or more sinister purposes. Third, 
individuals have little ability to control this collection or manipulation. Not 
only does much of this happen far from the reach of regulators, but most 
people are not even aware what information has been collected or how it is 
being used.lxii {Citations omitted} 
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 The accumulation and distribution of this flood of data exposes individuals to a 
variety of systemic vulnerabilities enabling widespread identity information theft that is 
impossible to prevent. 
 
A.  Vulnerabilities From Insecure Data Collection, Aggregation, Storage and 
Distribution. 
 
Today, massive amounts of personally identifiable information are collected, 
aggregated, stored and maintained by thousands of public and private entities with 
inadequate security protection. Government agencies, businesses, educational institutions, 
hospitals and other social institutions store large volumes of electronic data that are subject 
to potential theft, pose very serious threats to personal privacy.    Identity thieves can easily 
obtain, aggregate, sell and exploit this sensitive information using ultra-fast computers, 
massive amounts of inexpensive data storage, and the ability to transfer information instantly 
and remotely via the Internet. 
 
 Privacy expert Daniel Solove has noted the huge volume of personal information 
collected and maintained by various governmental entities regarding every aspect of personal 
life – financial, medical, professional, criminal, etc.  Prior to the late 1990s, most of these 
records were accessible to the public or available for purchase.lxiii  Today, merchants, banks, 
credit card companies, health care facilities, retirement plans and hundreds of other entities 
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affecting consumers daily routinely store and maintain massive amounts of personal data 
about their customers, clients and patients -- the very same data identity thieves exploit. 
 
 Before the digital revolution, records were kept on paper records were protected by 
their “practical obscurity” -- it was expensive and impractical to keep and maintain such 
records, and immensely difficult to attempt to assemble discrete items of personal 
information maintained by a variety of independent record keepers.lxiv  This is no longer the 
case.  Solove reported 165 data aggregation companies were selling public record 
information over the Internet.lxv The largest of these are Choice Point, Acxiom and 
LexisNexis.  ChoicePoint, which merged with LexisNexis in 2008, claimed to have access to 
more than 17 billion public records, including 90 million criminal records, 170 million annual 
vehicle registrations and 240 million consumer credit and demographic histories.lxvi In 
addition, there is a substantial gray market for personal information.lxvii   
 
Business enterprises gather extensive data about their customers that is used to build 
in-depth profiles that are a critical asset to modern businesses.lxviii  Data analytics is a $25 
billion industry with hundreds of data mining companies.lxix  Internet advertising companies 
track consumer online activities to support targeted advertising and behavioral marketing.  
All of this personal information, whether from public records or from private commercial or 
personal transactions, is susceptible to theft by criminal organizations operating multi-
million dollar identity theft schemes that become more sophisticated each year.lxx 
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These digital records are notoriously and dangerously insecure.  The Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse maintains a chronology of hundreds of reported data breaches since 2005.  By 
April 2009, more than 245 million records had been breached.lxxi   One information security 
firm estimates that 285 million records were compromised in 2008 alone.lxxii  No segment of 
government, business, education or industry is immune from such troubles.  Data has been 
stolen from government agencies, credit card companies, data aggregators, universities, 
hospitals, health plans, banks, insurance companies, media giants, and securities brokerages.  
In some cases the data was mistakenly sold to criminals, but theft of data occurs in a variety 
of means including attacks by hackers, use of keylogging software, theft of computers or 
backup tapes, loss of backup tapes in transit and employee malfeasance.lxxiii  
 
Massive amounts of personally identifiable information about millions of Americans 
has already been stolen and cannot be recovered.  This information is extensively available to 
identity thieves and will remain so for the foreseeable future.  The data not already stolen is 
vulnerable to future theft as discussed further below.  New privacy laws have not markedly 
interrupted the flow of personal data to identity thieves.  In the past, privacy of personal data 
was protected by its "practical obscurity".  Today so many parties use, share and rely on large 
volumes of personal identifiable information as a necessary part of modern living that 
restricting data flows to criminal elements is a "practical impossibility".  As one 
commentator put it, “statutes regulating use of information are already obsolete - the 
technology and types of harms change too fast”lxxiv. 
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B.  Vulnerabilities From Insecure Identification Document Systems 
 
The infrastructure of human identification in the United States is fundamentally 
insecure.  Prof. LoPucki has properly characterized the explosion of identity theft as a 
problem of human identification rather than theft.lxxv  Solove attributes identity theft to an 
architecture of vulnerability that is exploited by identity thieves to impersonate victims.lxxvi  
Our flawed identification systems make it impossible for lenders and merchants to 
distinguish between legitimate consumers and impostors who possess certain personal 
information used for identity theft.lxxvii 
 
The critical document in the U.S. identification system is the Social Security Number 
(“SSN”). The SSN functions as a de facto personal identifier, even though such a purpose was 
expressly disclaimed on the face of the cards.lxxviii  Organizations of many types use a 
person’s name together with the SSN to function as an “extended name” that can distinguish 
one person from all others, particularly from persons with same or similar names.lxxix
 
 U.S. 
consumers are heavily dependent upon the SSN because it is a practical necessity for credit, 
employment, health care and countless other forms of daily functioning in modern 
society.lxxx  The SSN is so widely held by thousands of entities, that it is a “financial time 
bomb”. lxxxi --  It is the magic key that opens the door to personal records and financial 
accounts for identity thieves.lxxxii 
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Unfortunately the SSN lacks the necessary protections that would protect it against 
counterfeiting.lxxxiii  The SSN card lacks a photo or a hologram so the card is easily 
reproduced using modern digital imaging and printing software.  Further, until the identity 
theft surge, legitimate SSN cards were easily obtained from the Social Security 
Administration by fraudulent means.lxxxiv   Multiple replacement cards for legitimate SSNs 
were readily obtained because they issued with less rigorous documentation based other 
publicly available documents such as birth certificates or counterfeit documents.lxxxv  Identity 
thieves also obtain new SSN cards in the names of newborn children using birth records.lxxxvi 
 
The SSN is a “token-based” form of identity, i.e. the person in possession of the 
token is presumed to be the person identified in token.lxxxvii  Passports, driver’s licenses and 
birth certificates are other examples of identity tokens. Tokens that do not contain 
photographs or physical descriptions, such as birth certificates and social security numbers, 
are especially insecure because it is not possible to compare the physical characteristics 
displayed on the token with the characteristics of the person presenting the token.lxxxviii
 
 For 
years, counterfeit and fraudulently issued birth certificates, and drivers’ licenses were 
relatively easy to obtain.  Thieves will use a single counterfeit, stolen identifier or fraudulently 
issued identity document as a “breeder document” to fraudulently obtain other officially 
issued identity documents, such as the SSN.lxxxix  
 
Congress has acted to make issuance of Social Security Cards more secure.xc  
Replacement cards were restricted to no more than 3 per year and improved standards for 
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verifying documents used for original or replacement cards.xci   The REAL ID Act 
established new authentication and security standards for state issued drivers’ licenses or 
state identification cards that often are used to obtain fraudulent Social Security cards.xcii  
While these are necessary improvements, the Social Security card still lacks enhancements 
such as machine readability, fingerprints, or biometric information that would seriously deter 
identity thieves and counterfeiters.xciii 
 
 The weaknesses in identification systems allow thieves to use false identity documents 
and stolen personal identity information to establish new credible identities posing as their 
victims. These identities are used fraudulently to obtain employment, credit cards, bank 
accounts, leases, mortgages and other forms of credit.xciv  More frightening is the fact that 
false identity documents enable other more serious crimes such as terrorism, money 
laundering, drug trafficking, alien smuggling, and weapons smuggling.xcv  Faulty 
identification authentication also imperils border security, and permits unauthorized persons 
to enter airports, military installations, federal buildings and other secure facilities.xcvi 
 
 Collectively, insecure records and insecure identification systems make information 
theft prevention impossible.  Credit granting processes that rely solely on identity 
information obtained from this insecure environment are at substantial risk for new account 
fraud.  Fortunately, the credit industry will able to overcome these weaknesses if it is 
provided with the proper incentives to do so. 
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IV.  Economic Loss From Information Theft Is Preventable. 
 
 Every day banks, credit card companies, financial institutions and merchant make 
decisions about whether to lend money, extend credit or sell goods on credit.  Their 
decisions will be based on an assessment of the prospective borrowers’ creditworthiness 
based on credit history information from a credit reporting agency (CRA).   Experian, 
Equifax and TranUnion are the three largest CRAs and each maintains files on over 200 
million Americans.xcvii  Relying on credit reports from the CRAs, lenders and merchants 
often act carelessly to extend credit to imposters who have stolen the identity information of 
their victims, causing billions of dollars in economic loss.  Unlike the insecurity of records 
systems and identity systems, this vulnerability is self-created by CRAs, lenders and 
merchants, and is substantially preventable.  While lenders, merchants and CRAs control the 
means to prevent these losses, they have no market or legal incentives to do so because the risks 
are borne by others. 
 
A. Insecure Credit Granting Processes Enable Economic Loss. 
 
 Like countless other record keepers, the CRA uses the SSN as an extended name and 
unique identifier to identify the relevant credit account.  When the CRA receives an order 
for a credit report, it must determine whether the credit applicant is truly the person 
identified in its credit records and not an identity thief.  To do so, it uses a knowledge-based 
identification method.  This method presumes that if the credit applicant is able to supply 
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unique knowledge that only the correct person would know, the applicant must be the 
correct person named in the credit report.xcviii  The knowledge requested of the credit 
applicant operates as a password to access the credit file and verify the identity of the 
applicant.  After matching certain knowledge fields, the CRA releases the credit report and 
the merchant or lender reviews the report to decide whether to extend credit. 
 
A knowledge-based password with be most secure if the knowledge is not widely 
known or attainable, can easily be changed by the account holder, and if numerous unique 
knowledge fields must match.   Unfortunately, the knowledge fields used as passwords by 
CRAs to match credit applicants to credit files are extremely insecure.  The knowledge fields 
are widely known and readily attainable rather than secret.  They are permanent rather than 
changeable.  Frequently those in the credit industry do not demand that the matching 
knowledge fields be either numerous or uniquely known.  Instead, they rely on the very 
fields most easily stolen and traded by identity thieves. 
 
The fields commonly used for the matching an applicant to a credit file are the SSN, 
name, address, and date of birth.xcix  In some cases perhaps a telephone number or mother’s 
maiden name may be used as well.c  Each these knowledge fields are widely available, are 
easily obtained by thousands of persons, and probably already in the possession of identity 
thieves due to the security issues mentioned aboveci.  They either do not change at all (SSN, 
birthdate, mother’s maiden name) or change infrequently (name, address, telephone 
number).  They are not uniquely known because nearly anyone can get access to them 
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through online directories.  It certainly is not difficult for resourceful identity thieves to 
obtain them, by legal or illegal means, and match them using data mining techniques.  These 
knowledge fields may have usefulness if they function as more precise identifiers or extended 
names for common names such as “John Smith”.cii   But these knowledge fields are utterly 
ill-suited as passwords used to allow access to a credit report and to authenticate the identity 
of the credit applicant.  The current system is creates unnecessary risk because both the 
extended name identifiers and passwords commonly used to obtain credit consist of the 
same readily available information.   
 
Once the CRA provides easy access to the credit report, it generally is up to the 
prospective lender or merchant to carefully verify whether the information in the report 
matches the information provided by the applicant and make the decision to extend credit.   
Merchants and lenders have control over the quality and amount of identity information they 
require and the care used in their identity verification procedures.  Unfortunately, credit 
reports frequently contain errorsciii or inconsistencies that complicate the ability to identify 
the applicant.  Credit reports often may contain inaccurate information submitted by past 
creditors.civ   Many identity thieves would be thwarted if CRAs and creditors were simply 
more careful in their reporting and lending practices.cv Precise matching of extended name 
fields can be a challenge because more than 38 million Americans move to a new residence 
each year. cvi   Millions more become married, divorced or use second addresses such as 
vacation homes.cvii  Lenders and merchants may willingly create risks by overlooking 
discrepancies rather than losing a sale or lending transaction. 
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 Given the enormity of identity theft losses, the credit industry’s failure to rigorously 
enhance the security of their lending practices seems wholly irrational.  In fact, however, 
CRAs, lenders, and merchants are responding appropriately to the incentives and 
disincentives in the market. The credit reporting industry, the consumer lending industry and 
merchants have strong incentives to make large volumes of credit available as quickly, easily 
and inexpensively as possible.   CRAs have control over the accuracy of their information 
and could restrict release of credit reports only upon careful matching of several knowledge 
fields that are not readily available from online records.  In the highly competitive credit 
industry, however, the ability to rapidly open new credit account “tradelines” is critical.cviii  
The CRA uses an automatic and highly mechanical process to match the information 
provided by the applicant (principally just the name and SSN) to an existing credit file within 
seconds.cix  The ability to produce the report instantly is an important feature of the CRAs’ 
service.  CRAs must provide the fastest possible credit verification service or lose their 
merchants and lender clients to faster providers.  The CRAs have no incentive to create 
rigorous identity authentication standards that remove unnecessary risks because those risks 
are substantially borne by others. 
 
Similarly, lenders who take the time to pursue extensive credit verification processes 
to reconcile credit report discrepancies will incur greater costs and lose credit volume to 
faster, more convenient lenders.  For merchants the benefits of facilitating more sales by 
providing instant credit may outweigh the risks costs of identity theft.   Prof. Sovern points 
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out that merchants and lenders with tight credit procedures may offend customers who will 
take their business to less inquisitive competitors.cx   The economic losses to merchants 
arising from identity theft are estimated to be approximately one percent of total retail 
sales.cxi   Thus, if the name and SSN are somewhat close to matching, lenders and merchants 
have significant market incentives to take risks by willingly disregarding credit report 
discrepancies rather than refuse a new sales or lending opportunity. 
 
Collectively these practices create a lending environment of unnecessary risk that is 
fully avoidable.  The situation is much like the sub-prime lending crisis, in which the market 
participants understood that they were introducing substantial risks into the financial system, 
but continued to so.  Borrowers, loan brokers, banks and secondary market investors all had 
substantial and immediate financial incentives to continue creating excessive risk.   They 
relied on a mistaken belief that the risks could be shifted to other parties and would not 
affect the financial system as a whole.   Credit industry participants also have continued to 
create unnecessary risk because of its immediate benefits.  But the excessive risks to identity 
theft victims and to society at large have become too great to tolerate any longer. 
 
B. Creating Incentives For Secure Credit Processes Will Prevent Economic Loss From 
Information Theft. 
 
 Economic losses from fraudulent new accounts will remain rampant because those 
who control and profit from the instant credit practices are not held accountable for the full 
 24 
range of the losses caused.  Prof. Sovern proposes that loss allocation principles be applied 
to the costs of identity theft.  Under such principles, the loss should be reallocated to the 
parties who are best able to avoid the loss at the least cost.cxii  The present system perversely 
places great loss on the party with the least control - consumers. 
 
CRAs have control over the collection, organization and dissemination of credit 
information and thus could offer more accurate identification and robust authentication.  
For example, CRAs have the ability to establish and implement systems that would rely on 
more sophisticated passwords.  These could require multiple fields of information that are 
unique to each consumer, not widely known or discoverable, and are controlled and 
changeable by individual consumers. These systems to reduce risk do not exist because 
CRAs have no incentive to incur the costs necessary to create them.   
  
Credit reporting agencies bear few, if any, costs of identity theft despite having the 
greatest ability to prevent loss on new accounts.  This is the inverse of traditional loss 
allocation rules.  The FCRA substantially shields CRAs from liability for the content of their 
reports except in limited circumstances.  There are disincentives for individual CRAs to take 
meaningful steps to prevent losses.  First, developing robust authentication procedures to 
reduce risk will incur costs without providing benefits.  Second, unless all CRAs were 
required to develop similar procedures the increased costs could make prices of an individual 
CRA less competitive.  More rigorous practices also would slow credit approval times and 
the CRA will lose clients to less rigorous providers. Third, and most perversely of all, CRAs 
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are able profit by selling credit monitoring services that allow consumers to monitor their 
credit files for suspicious activity.cxiii  The CRAs both create the risk, and then profit from 
insuring the risk.  Note, however, that such services merely allow consumers to discover 
economic losses from information theft more quickly rather than prevent economic loss 
before it occurs. 
 
Merchants and lenders initially bear the bulk of the approximately $50 billion in 
annual economic losses from identity theft.cxiv  Under loss allocation rules, this is appropriate 
because merchants and lenders have the ability to prevent loss by using greater caution.  As 
noted above, if the profits of increased sales enabled by instant credit exceed the economic 
losses of identity theft, merchants have no incentive to tighten their credit practices.  
Further, assuming that the losses are either widely and/or evenly distributed among 
competitors, all merchants will be able to pass along the losses to consumers through higher 
prices without loss of price competitiveness. If so, then consumers ultimately pay 
substantially all of the $50 billion of economic loss of identity theft through higher prices.   
On the other hand, selected lenders and merchants acting alone to reduce risky practices will 
incur additional costs and potentially lose customers.  Under such a cost-benefit analysis, it is 
rational behavior for merchants and lenders to continue to create risk and to tolerate identity 
theft losses.cxv   
 
While this behavior is rational on purely economic grounds, it ignores the huge 
external costs borne by consumers and society.   Consumers' out of pocket losses from lax 
 26 
credit authentication practices greatly outweigh the benefits they perceive from the instant 
credit environment.  Consumers directly suffer more than $5 billion dollars of identity theft 
losses annually.cxvi   They also may suffer indirectly from higher prices passed on by 
merchants, the costs to remedy the harms of identity theft, and through the cost of credit 
monitoring services.    
 
Nor do lenders, merchants or the credit industry bear the huge external non-
economics costs to consumers.  The FTC 2007 Survey, the FTC 2003 Survey, the ITRC 
Study, and Prof. Sovern all describe how consumers grievously suffer from the damage to 
their credit ratings, the time spent to correct erroneous information, to defend against claims 
for payment and even crimes committed in their names.cxvii  While consumers have strong 
incentives to prevent these economic and personal losses, they have little power to do so.  
They have little control over how their information is collected and disseminated by CRAs, 
or how it is accessed and used by credit grantors, or the means used to verify the identity of 
imposters attempting to borrow in their name. The FACT Act has provided consumers only 
with some rights to review and correct their credit information, to place fraud alerts on their 
credit files and assistance in recovering from the harms inflicted by identity theft that has 
already occurred. cxviii 
 
In addition, the substantial costs to society are not borne by the credit industry 
participants that could prevent them.  Identity theft costs society several million dollars to 
investigate and prosecute.  The billions of dollars stolen annually through identity fraud are 
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diverted to support organized crime, terrorism and other criminal enterprises causing other 
societal harm.  The cumulative losses to consumers, business and society -- losses that are 
largely preventable -- are too great to justify further inaction to correct the insecure and 
vulnerable credit authentication system.   
 
New legislation is necessary to make the credit system more secure and to prevent 
economic loss from identity theft.  The most effective legislative strategy will be a two-
pronged approach.  First, create incentives for more secure credit authentication by 
imposing liability for identity theft on the parties in the credit system.   Second, grant 
consumers substantial control over the security measures required before their credit 
information can be released by CRAs or used to establish new accounts by merchants and 
lenders. 
  
 Applying loss allocation principles, legislation should impose liability on CRAs for 
losses caused by releases of a credit report if they breach a duty of care to properly 
authenticate the identity of the credit applicant.  Facing billions of dollars in annual liability, 
CRAs would have a strong incentive to create a cost effective authentication system in which 
the SSN, date of birth and other knowledge fields would serve only as extended names, not 
passwords.  CRAs would create systems to establish robust passwords for each credit filethat 
are known only to the credit applicant, that require matching of multiple fields, and that 
require the fields to be changed from time to time.  These could be similar to the security 
questions now used by banks to authenticate access to online accounts.  
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 Similarly, merchants and lenders should be liable if they fail to meet their duty of  
care to verify that the identity of the credit applicant is consistent with the credit report 
released by the CRA.  Consumers should not be liable for any economic loss arising from 
new account fraud absent their own carelessness.cxix  Consumers should be able to recover 
damages for the costs of repairing damage to their credit files and credit rating that result. 
Since such legislation would impose liability on all CRAs, lenders and merchants, each 
competitor would have a strong market incentive to develop the fastest and most cost 
effective methods for credit authentication that are sufficient to avoid liability, while still 
maintaining the best features of instant credit access desired by consumers.  
 
  Prof. Sovern suggests that a scheme of statutory liquidated damages and attorney fees 
also might be implemented that would impose sufficient costs on lenders and/or CRAs to 
create further incentives for robust credit authentication.cxx  The level of damages could be 
set to appropriately reflect the typical non-economic harms suffered by victims and high 
enough to create further incentives for strong authentication.  If the combination of actual 
damages, statutory damages and attorneys fees were greater than the costs of better credit 
authentication procedures, CRAs would implement robust procedures in a quick and 
efficient way. 
 
 An additional benefit of imposing losses upon the credit granting industries is their 
superior ability to identify, reduce and spread the risks of identity fraud losses broadly 
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among all market participants.  Strengthening credit authentication systems will create initial 
transaction costs for the credit industry.  These costs should be substantially less than the 
savings from preventing  the billions lost to identity thieves.  These costs can be recouped by 
imposing an additional charge on each of the one billion credit reports issued each year.cxxi     
Spreading the risk also reduces the highly disproportionate losses of the present system in 
which a few random unfortunate victims suffer substantial economic and non-economic 
losses and many others suffer none.cxxii 
 
 While such cost-shifting legislation is highly desirable, it will be strongly opposed by 
industry groups such as the Consumer Data Industry Association.   The credit industry has 
demonstrated the political clout necessary to stifle other attempts to broaden the liability of 
CRAs and the credit industry.  Such legislation is unlikely to be enacted until identity theft 
losses become so pervasive and severe that such proposals become politically feasible. In the 
absence of legislation creating incentives for the credit industry to take responsibility for 
protecting consumers, the next best alternative is to empower consumers to protect 
themselves. 
  
As is further discussed below, empowering consumers with the right to freeze access 
to their credit records is an important first step toward preventing new account fraud and 
the economic loss.  In the future these rights should be expanded to equip consumers with 
even broader powers to control the security of their credit accounts. 
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V. State Credit Freeze Legislation. 
 
 It is impossible to prevent identity thieves from obtaining important personal 
information.  There simply is too much information, too easily accessed by too many parties 
and subject to too much vulnerability to theft and misuse.  Current remedies for identity 
information theft are retrospective.  They focus upon criminalizing past conduct, recovering 
money stolen and repairing damage already done to victims.  In contrast state credit freeze 
legislation is a prophylactic remedy.  When a credit freeze is in place CRAs are prohibited 
from releasing any credit information without the consumer's consent.  The credit freeze 
empowers individual consumers to take action to protect themselves before theft occurs.   
 
 California pioneered the credit freeze in 2001 by enacting legislation taking effect on 
January 1, 2003.cxxiii  Forty-eight states have enacted some form of credit freeze legislation.cxxiv  
Only Alabama, and Michigan lack credit freeze laws.cxxv  The adoption of credit freeze laws in 
a majority of states led the three largest CRAs, Experian, TransUnion and Equifax, to 
voluntarily permit consumers in any state to place a credit freeze as of November 1, 2007.cxxvi 
 
 The credit freeze provides superior protection compared to the fraud alert available 
to consumers under the FACT Act since 2004.cxxvii  The fraud alert notifies potential credit 
grantors that new credit is not to be extended without verifying the identity of the consumer 
identified in the credit report.  However, the fraud alert does not prohibit release of the 
credit report.cxxviii The consumer is protected only if the merchant or lender receiving the 
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report is diligent in verifying the borrower's identity.   In contrast, credit freeze legislation 
prohibits CRAs from releasing the credit report or any information from the report without 
the prior express authorization from the consumer.cxxix   
 
 Initially, some states enacting the credit freeze made it available only to identity theft 
victims.  This was problematic because consumers frequently do not discover new account 
fraud until substantial losses have already occurred.  The FTC 2003 Survey found that 24 
percent of victims did not discover that new accounts had been opened in their name for 
more than 6 months.cxxx Another 33 percent of victims discovered the new accounts 
between 1 and 5 months later.cxxxi  The IRTC Study found that 24% of victims did not 
discover the theft for more than two years.cxxxii  The Javelin 2005 survey found that frauds 
involving new accounts correlated with the longest detection times and a mean loss of over 
$12,000.cxxxiii   
 
 Statutes that required consumers to be victimized before requesting a freeze thwarted  
consumers' ability to act to prevent theft from occurring.  This requirement has not been 
included in most recent statutes and has been removed from older statutes.cxxxiv A substantial 
majority of the states now allow any consumer to seek a security freeze.  Only Arkansascxxxv, 
Kansascxxxvi, Mississippicxxxvii and South Dakotacxxxviii continue to limit the credit freeze 
protection to victims of identity theft.  These states typically require victims to supply the 
credit reporting agencies with a copy of a police report, investigative report, or filed 
complaint along with their written request for a security freeze.cxxxix  
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 California’s law provided a model substantially followed other states.cxl  State credit 
freeze statutes follow an “opt-in” regime.  Consumers must take action to elect to place, 
temporarily lift or remove a freeze at any time for any reason.  To implement the freeze, the 
consumer typically must notify the CRA in writing,cxli and provide “proper identification”.cxlii  
To ensure full protection consumers should place a freeze request with each of the three 
major CRAs.  The CRA typically has short time period to place the freeze,cxliii and must send 
written confirmation of the freeze shortly thereafter.cxliv  The confirmation must contain a 
unique personal identification number (PIN) or password that the consumer must use to 
remove or temporarily lift the freeze.cxlv  The CRA must also disclose the process for placing 
and temporarily lifting the freeze.cxlvi  Many states have a required statutory notice that must 
be sent to consumers.cxlvii  The CRAs may advise third parties that a freeze is in effect.cxlviii    
 
The freeze remains in effect until the consumer removes it.cxlix  The consumer may 
temporarily lift the freeze for a specific party or time period by providing proper 
identification,cl the unique PIN or password, and the proper information regarding the party 
permitted to receive the report.cli The freeze must be lifted promptly, and the CRAs often 
are authorized to develop phone, fax or electronic procedures.clii  If the freeze is not lifted, 
the third party requesting the report may treat a credit application as incomplete.cliii  The 
consumer can remove the freeze by providing proper identification and the unique PIN.cliv  
The CRA may remove a freeze that was frozen due to a material misrepresentation of fact by 
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the consumer, but must provide written notice to the consumer before removing the 
freeze.clv 
 
 CRAs may charge a fee for placing, temporarily lifting and removing a fee.  Many of 
the state statutes establish maximum charges for each service.clvi  The early freeze statutes 
typically set maximum fees in a range between $10 and $20.clvii  Victims of identity theft 
submitting a police report or investigative report usually are not charged a fee to place the 
freeze.clviii   
 
 Typical state statutes permit CRAs to issue credit reports to certain parties even while 
the security freeze is in effect.  First, if the consumer has existing financial obligations, 
accounts, demand deposit accounts or negotiable instruments, a credit report can be issued 
the creditor that is owed the debt, and their agents and affiliates.clix  The report may be used 
only for the purpose of collecting the debt or reviewing the account, which includes account 
maintenance, monitoring, credit line increases and account upgrades and enhancements.clx 
When the consumer temporarily lifts the freeze for new credit, the CRA can release the 
report to affiliates and subsidiaries of the prospective credit grantor for use related to 
extension of credit and “other permissible use”.clxi  Second, reports can be released to 
government agencies, collection agencies and others acting pursuant to a court order.clxii  
Third, typical state credit freeze statutes provide exceptions that permit use of reports to 
support variety of uses such as child support, health care fraud, tax collection, permitted pre-
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screening under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and credit monitoring services to which the 
consumer has subscribed.clxiii  
 
 The opt-in approach of current legislation is perhaps its weakest feature.  Placing a 
credit freeze requires consumers to take an affirmative preventative action to freeze their 
credit.  Under the current credit system, the default position is that credit reports and 
information are accessed with minimal consumer control over the report's dissemination.   
In addition, consumers need to be aware of the freeze and must have accurate information 
about freeze rights.  The limits of the opt-in approach are demonstrated by the limited use of 
freeze rights.  The President's Identity Theft Task Force asked the Federal Trade 
Commission to review the impact and effectiveness of state credit freeze legislation.clxiv    As 
of March 2008, only 125,000 consumers, a mere .07 percent of all consumers with freeze 
rights guaranteed by state legislation, had used the credit freeze.clxv  The FTC conducted the 
review in early 2008 and received many comments regarding disincentives to using freeze 
rights.clxvi  
 
 The voluntary opt-in approach relies heavily upon freeze procedures that are 
convenient, fast and inexpensive.  Early credit freeze legislation included features that 
discouraged consumers from using their freeze rights.  Initial freeze procedures required use 
of mail or certified mail, slow processing times of 3 to 10 days and significant expense of $10 
to $20 to place, lift or remove a freeze.  Since a freeze request must be sent to all three major 
CRAs to be effective, these fees are effectively tripled in cost.clxvii  It was incongruous that 
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credit could be granted instantly and at low cost by electronic means, but theft prevention 
measures by consumers required slow, cumbersome and expensive means.  
  
 Consumers Union and AARP each supplied the FTC with surveys regarding the 
barriers to consumer use of the credit freeze.  The AARP study noted difficulty in placing 
the freeze, inability to quickly lift the freeze and cost as significant disincentives to use of the 
freeze.clxviii  The Consumers Union survey noted that consumer demand for credit freezes was 
strong.clxix  In fact, CRAs had begun marketing "commercially developed freeze options" 
("CDFOs") featuring instant credit freezes that are bundled with credit monitoring and other 
for-profit services to meet this demand.clxx  Consumers Union recommended that the 
affordability, accessibility and convenience of credit freeze procedures be improved by 
implementing a single resource for placing, lifting and removing credit freeze rather than the 
current duty to separately notify all three major CRAs.clxxi   The survey also noted that 
consumers need consistent information about credit freeze rights, especially when CDFOs 
are bundled with credit monitoring and other services.  Consumers Union recommended a 
public awareness campaign to improve consumer education about credit freeze rights.clxxii  
 
 States have acted to remove the disincentives to using credit freeze rights in response 
to continuing identity theft losses and consumer demand.  As noted above, most states allow 
all consumers to place a freeze, not just identity theft victims.  States are reducing freeze 
costs by lowering the maximum fees that CRAs can charge.  Indiana requires CRAs to place, 
lift and remove freezes without charge,clxxiii Montana, Georgia and Nebraska require a 
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maximum charge of $3.clxxiv   States also are increasing the convenience of the credit freeze by 
requiring CRAs to temporarily lift a freeze within in 15 minutes.clxxv 
 
 Given the very low awareness of the credit freeze,clxxvi and the tiny percentage taking 
advantage of their freeze rights,clxxvii one might conclude that the credit freeze statutes are had 
very little impact.  However, these statutes have established very important principles that lay 
the groundwork for greater consumer control over credit than ever before.   First, for the 
first time all consumers have the ability to control access to their credit accounts.  CRAs now 
have a duty to create a consumer-managed account for each credit file upon request.  Since 
California's law took effect in 2003, CRAs have built the technical infrastructure and systems 
to handle individual consumer management of credit accounts.  Second, these consumers are 
now identified by a unique PIN number that functions as the password to control their 
credit information.  This PIN is not currently in possession of identity thieves nor can it be 
obtained through data aggregation and mining techniques from other public information.   
Third, these statutes have demonstrated the ability of states to take the lead in developing 
innovative solutions to the problems of identity theft rather than awaiting delayed and weak 
federal solutions. 
 
 With this important foundation in place, states should continue to incrementally 
expand consumer power over their credit accounts.  To overcome the weaknesses of an opt-
in system, states should do more than merely remove disincentives to use of the credit 
freeze.  Instead states should give consumers the tools to manage access to their credit 
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accounts and the incentives to do so carefully.  One possibility is to require CRAs to allow 
each consumer to create a PIN-Protected Consumer Managed Report (herein referred to as 
a "PPCMR") with the CRAs even without immediately placing a freeze, i.e. while permitting 
open access to the credit account.  Consumers could then exercise their freeze rights by 
placing or lifting a freeze from time to time as needed.   
 
 States also should act to create attractive incentives for consumers to create a 
PPCMR.  For example, states could make some discretionary state services available only to 
those with a PPCMR.   For example, the convenience of paying state fees online, reserving a 
camping spot in a state park online, or receiving electronic payments from the state could be 
available made only to those with a PPCMR.   Private financial entities such as banks also 
could create incentives to establish a PPCMR. Soon establishing a PPCMR would become a 
commonplace and ordinary feature of modern financial life, like having an ATM card, direct 
deposit of wages, or having repeating payments automatically deducted from a bank account. 
 
 The next step would be to use the PPCMR to offer enhanced security features 
created and managed by consumers without cost.   The credit freeze has only two positions - 
frozen and thawed.  Currently, without a freeze in place, credit is always thawed and access 
to the credit account relies on pitifully weak security - matching of extended name fields 
such as the SSN, date of birth and address.  By placing a freeze, the consumer uses the 
unique PIN as an additional security password in addition to the extended fields.  Once a 
PPCMR exists, consumers could customize the degree of security, in addition to the PIN, 
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that they find suitable.  They could by specify the number and kinds of knowledge fields 
required to function as sufficient passwords to release the credit information.clxxviii 
 
 After creating a PPCMR, cautious consumers could, for example, require that a large 
number of matching knowledge fields, in addition to their PIN, must be submitted to 
function as a password.  The consumers should choose unique knowledge fields not 
available to identity thieves, such as:  names of pets, childhood nicknames, youngest sibling's 
birthday, etc.clxxix They could also require photo ID of a particular type as an additional 
safeguard, such as a passport, employer ID badge, etc.   Cautious consumers could change 
the questions frequently.  Less cautious consumers could require only one knowledge field in 
addition to the PIN from the CRA.  In this sense, the credit account is constantly "frozen" 
by the multiple passwords, but available to be thawed instantly by the correct owner of the 
accounts who possesses the unique knowledge to match all of the chosen passwords.   
 
 To create incentives for strong security, legislation could limit liability for new 
account fraud based on the degree of security consumers maintain on their PPCMR.  For 
example, if a consumer meets robust security standards - $50 maximum liability, similar to 
credit card accounts.  If the consumer establishes only moderate security - $1000 maximum 
liability; if the consumer chooses weak security or an open credit account - $5,000 maximum 
liability.  Incentives also could be created for the CRAs.  Once a PPCMR were created, the 
CRAs liability could be limited only to those instances in which they release credit 
information in violation of the consumer's security instructions. 
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 Some commentators have suggested that access to credit accounts should be 
restricted at all times unless a consumer chooses to authorize a release.  Chris Jay Hoofnagle 
argued for this “opt-out” approach.clxxx  The significant advantage of Hoofnagle’s proposal 
is that it forces consumers to make conscious decisions about access to their credit report 
information.  Consumers will be forced to establish a direct relationship with CRAs by 
creating an PIN identified account allowing management their credit information.  The 
significant disadvantage is that a sudden migration to frozen credit will cause significant 
disruption for CRAs and consumers.  CRAs will face substantial costs from enrolling the 
99% of consumers not currently using their freeze rights.  In addition, thousands of 
consumers will not prepare properly for the shift and will suddenly be unable to access their 
credit.  The situation would be likely be similar the conversion from analog to digital 
television.  Despite a long phase-in period and a major public awareness campaign, the 
conversion still had to be delayed by Congressional action.clxxxi 
 
The opt-in regime of the current freeze legislation, coupled with improved incentives 
for consumers, lenders and CRAs, will provide for a more orderly transition toward a system 
of greater consumer control.  As more consumers establish PPCMR's costs shift to the 
CRAs.  The major costs will arise from properly identifying the consumers to establish the 
unique PIN and establish a PPCMR.  After this initial expense, costs to maintain the 
accounts should be low.  Even though the CRAs have nearly 200 million customers, the 
security passwords involve only small amounts of data.  By comparison, FaceBook recently 
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topped 200 million subscribers.clxxxii   Yet FaceBook is able to manage users that post large 
volumes of high capacity files such as video and photos. Further, the costs that arise can be 
limited and spread.  As Prof. Sovern points out, the CRAs are in best position to efficiently 
reach risk neutrality, and they can spread costs to borrowers and lenders through fees 
charged for their services.clxxxiii  
 
Some have suggested that a federal credit freeze law would be preferable to state laws 
because it could provide uniform procedures.clxxxiv  Two bills were introduced in Congress in 
2007 and both were referred to committee without further action.clxxxv  While Congress has 
delayed, the states pioneered the freeze law and have continuously improved them.  States 
have proven themselves as successful innovators in response to identity theft concerns.  
Consumer organizations have opposed creation of a federal credit freeze law for two 
reasons.  First, a federal law that preempts state law would prevent state legislatures from 
continuing to innovate to protect consumer from identity fraud.  Second, federal laws often 
are weaker than the state laws that respond quickly and strongly to consumer concerns.clxxxvi 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
  
 Laws aimed at preventing information theft have not reduced either the incidence or 
cost of identify fraud.  Strong laws are needed to prevent the economic losses from identity 
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theft.   Current identity authentication systems are vulnerable and processes for granting 
credit create unnecessary risks that are preventable.   While legislation requiring credit 
reporting agencies, lenders and merchants to bear the risks of their credit granting 
procedures, these laws are unlikely to be enacted in the immediate future.  However, state 
laws permitting consumers to place a freeze on their credit reports are an important first step 
in granting consumers control over access to the credit reports.  States should continue to  
innovate to make use of the freeze convenient and inexpensive, and should create incentives 
for using the freeze.  In addition, consumer power over access to their credit accounts 
should be expanded to allow them to customize the security regarding the safety of their 
credit information. 
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